Globalization and Diversification of Islamic Movements: Three Turkish Cases

AHMET T. KURU

In the aftermath of the September 11 events, debates raged about the tension between the West and the Muslim world, and between globalization and Islamic movements. Some authors were reminded of the "clash of civilization" thesis arguing an essential cultural incompatibility between the West and the Muslim world.[1] Others pointed to an antagonistic relationship between globalization, originating from and arguably controlled by the West, and Islamic movements, which resist this process. The World Trade Center was targeted because it symbolized globalization.[2] According to this perspective, what we are seeing is a tension between Jihad and McWorld.[3]

Although these arguments are exaggerations, they are not baseless speculation.[4] There are Islamic movements that oppose globalization in order to preserve their identities and ways of life. These movements see globalization as a new phase of Western colonialism. Therefore, their resistance to globalization

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[1] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

[2] For the relationship between September 11 and globalization, see Walter LaFeber, "The Post September 11 Debate over Empire, Globalization, and Fragmentation," *Political Science Quarterly* 117 (Spring 2002): 1–17.

[3] Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996).

[4] Fred Halliday, *Islam & the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 110–111.

AHMET T. KURU is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Political Science, University of Washington. His dissertation analyzes secularism and state–religion relations in the United States, France, and Turkey. He has published various articles on Islam and modernity, and on nation building in Central Asia.

coincides with their anti-Western mentality. They blame the West for the moral bankruptcy and other problems of the world. They also claim that democracy is anti-Islamic because it replaces God's sovereignty with that of the people.[5]

Yet, analysis of the Turkish Islamic movements indicates that Islamic movements do not have a homogenous attitude toward globalization. Some of them, for example, the Gülen movement, have supported globalization, whereas others, for example, the early Milli Görüş (National Outlook) and the Haydar Baş movements, have opposed it. The attitudes of these movements toward globalization are not only diverse but also changeable. The followers of the Milli Görüş movement, for instance, have adopted varying views on this issue, as I will explain later.

I selected the cases of the Gülen and the Milli Görüş movements because they have been the two most influential Islamic movements in Turkey. The Haydar Baş movement is marginal in comparison to these two. Yet, it is an important example of an antiglobalization Islamic movement. It is also an interesting case for examining the new anti-European Union (EU) coalition in Turkey that includes groups from Islamic, secular, nationalist, and leftist backgrounds.

Why do certain Islamic movements support globalization and others oppose it? I argue that the attitudes toward globalization and the West of the Turkish Islamic movements are contingent on two variables—opportunity structures and the normative frameworks of movements. The hypotheses that I will test are: first, the more an Islamic movement benefits from international opportunity structures shaped by globalization, the more it becomes pro-globalization; and second, the more the normative framework of an Islamic movement is tolerant and open to cross-cultural interactions, the more it becomes pro-globalization. I will test these two hypotheses on five cases: the Gülen movement, the Haydar Baş movement, the early Milli Görüş movement, the elders of the late Milli Görüş movement, and the young generation of the late Milli Görüş movement.

The fact that these movements are operating in the same country, Turkey, helps to control many domestic variables. That does not mean that this is a single-case study. My unit of analysis is a movement, not a country. Variation of social movements may be analyzed not only through cross-country analysis but also through cross-movement and cross-time comparisons.[6] This essay performs cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses by comparing social movements and

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[5] Anti-Western Islamic movements generally refer to Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) "who offers a critique of modernity as *jahiliyya*, a kind of global pathology." Roxanne L. Euben, "Mapping Modernities, 'Islamic' and 'Western'" in Fred R. Dallmayr, ed., *Border Crossings: Toward a Comparative Political Theory* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999), 19.

[6] Dieter Rucht, "The Impact of National Contexts on Social Movement Structures: A Cross-Movement and Cross-National Comparison" in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 193–199.

their transformations since the 1990s. The cross-movement analysis of the paper explains the diversity of Islamic movements, and its cross-time examination, based on the method of process tracing,[7] explains their changes.

Are the results of this analysis generalizable or bounded by Turkey's "unique" conditions? If all Islamic movements in Turkey had a homogenous and positive attitude toward globalization, one might claim that these movements were shaped by Turkey's peculiar conditions, such as its geographical proximity to the West, historical experience as a noncolonized country, or secular and democratic regime. However, the three factors—geography, history, and regime—have existed for decades and have been experienced by all movements. Therefore, these factors can explain neither the transformations of Turkish Islamic movements since the 1990s nor the diversity among them. Instead, these movements are shaped by some generalizable factors, such as opportunity structures and the normative frameworks of movements, which affect other Islamic movements as well. Therefore, the theoretical perspective of this paper can be used to examine Islamic movements in other countries.

The movements examined here are social movements that are nonstate, nonprofit, nonviolent, and voluntary. They are also Islamic, because Islam constitutes their ideational framework and basis of solidarity.[8] Islamic movements have been analyzed by different approaches. "Essentialism" generally focuses on the alleged uniqueness, exceptionalism, or unity of the Muslim world.[9] Therefore, it examines Islamic movements through the so-called religious and cultural peculiarities. Criticism of the essentialist approach has recently become widespread.[10] The anti-essentialists, or one may call them "contextualists," have shown that Islamic phenomena are more complex than the essentialists assume. They have demonstrated the contextual change and diversity in the Muslim world as they relate to modernity,[11] liberalism,[12] and democracy.[13] The main

[7] See James Mahoney, "Strategies of Causal Inference in Small-*N* Analysis," *Sociological Method & Research* 28 (May 2000): 412–415; Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, "Process Tracing in Case Study Research," paper presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Harvard University, 17–19 October 1997.

[8] For discussions on religious and socioeconomic dimensions of Islamic movements, see Edmund Burke, "Islam and Social Movements: Methodological Reflections" in Edmund Burke, III and Ira Lapidus, eds., *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 17–37.

[9] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 174–179, 209–218, 254–258; Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (New York: Perennial, 2003); Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic Monthly* 266 (September 1990): 47–60.

[10] Edward D. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979); Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Aziz al-Azmeh, *Islams and Modernities* (New York: Verso, 1996).

[11] Nilüfer Göle, *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

[12] Charles Kurzman, ed., *Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[13] Robert W. Heffner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

weakness of many contextualist works, however, is their lack of causal explanation. They generally try to understand Islamic movements through an interpretivist methodology, rather than to explain the causes of their transformation. This paper, with very few others,[14] makes a contribution to the contextualist approach by applying the social movement literature to the analysis of Islamic movements. Additionally, it analyzes an issue neglected by contextualists—the relationship between Islamic movements and globalization.

This paper also makes two contributions to the literature on social movements. First, it fills the gap in the social movements literature mentioned by Doug McAdam: "Movements scholars have, to date, grossly undervalued the impact of *global* political and economic process in structuring the *domestic* possibilities for successful collective action."[15] To date, very few works have been published on this issue.[16] The present paper contributes to the literature by explaining the impact of globalization on both international and domestic opportunity structures and the influence of these structures on social movements.

Second, discussion of resource mobilization theory and the political process model dominated social movement literature until the late 1990s. Recently, a group of scholars has attempted to construct a "synthetic" approach, which includes different allegedly dichotomous factors.[17] This essay contributes to this synthesizing approach by analyzing both structural and agency-based factors. It analyzes the interaction between opportunity structures and the normative frameworks of movements, and the impact of this interaction on the movements' attitudes.

Scholars of political science generally avoid analyzing ideas as explanatory variables because of the risk of tautological explanations. By using normative

[14] Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003); Christopher Alexander, "Opportunities, Organizations, and Ideas: Islamists and Workers in Tunisia and Algeria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32 (November 2000): 465–490; Ziad Munson, "Islamic Mobilization: Social Movements Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," *The Sociological Quarterly* 42 (Fall 2001): 487–510.

[15] Doug McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions" in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, 34; emphases original.

[16] See, for two of the rare examples, John A. Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., *Globalizations and Social Movements: Culture, Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Donatella della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Dieter Rucht, eds., *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

[17] Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, "Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution" in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 142–173; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*; Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Charles Kurzman, "Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979," *American Sociological Review* 61 (February 1996): 153–170.

frameworks as an explanatory variable, I do not mean that a movement constructs a pro-globalization discourse if it has a pro-globalization normative framework, which is apparently a tautology. I use the movements' normative frameworks (*Risale-i Nur* for the Gülen movement, political Islamism and conservative democracy for the groups in the Milli Görüş movement, and religio-nationalism for the Haydar Baş movement) as sets of general norms and values that do not determine, but, rather, affect the movements' attitudes on specific subjects, such as globalization.

In this regard, having a tolerant normative framework and being pro-globalization are different but closely related conditions. An Islamic movement may be defined as tolerant if it is open to inter-faith dialogue and respectful of cultural diversity. We can categorize an Islamic movement, on the other hand, as pro-globalization if it takes a position for increasing the transnational flow of people, goods, and ideas around the globe, rather than for cultural fragmentation and the ghettoization of the world. In the Turkish context, one of the best concrete signs of being pro-globalization is support for the country's integration into the EU.

In sum, having a tolerant normative framework is generally a necessary but not sufficient condition for an Islamic movement to be pro-globalization. In the case of the Gülen movement, for example, we will see that before its interaction with international opportunity structures, the movement remained indifferent toward globalization despite the fact that it has always had a tolerant normative framework. That is why I attach importance to both normative frameworks and international opportunity structures as two interconnected factors that shape Islamic movements' attitude toward globalization. In the first two sections of the paper, I will explain the interaction between globalization and opportunity structures in general, as well as in Turkey. Then, I will test the two hypotheses through the analyses of the cases.

GLOBALIZATION AND OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

Globalization has a plethora of definitions. In this paper, I use this term as the intensification of worldwide political, economic, and sociocultural relations.[18] Globalization, therefore, implies the increasing flow of money, goods, services, ideas, and people across national borders. Globalization has two main pillars. The first is global capitalism, which depends on the increase of *cross*-border, *open*-border, and *trans*-border economic relations.[19] The other is the development and spread of communications technologies, which shrink the world.[20]

[18] Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 64. See also John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); James H. Mittleman, *The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[19] Jan Art Scholte, "Global Capitalism and the State," *International Affairs* 73 (July 1997): 430–432.

[20] See Jeffrey James, *Globalization, Information Technology and Development* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

Globalization has had an impact on both domestic and international opportunity structures that affect social movements. To understand the impact of globalization on opportunity structures, we need to disaggregate the alleged dichotomy between globalization and the nation-state. The relationship between globalization and the nation-state is not a zero-sum game. Globalization empowers the free market system at the expense of the statist regimes. Nevertheless, by no means does it eliminate the role of states in the international economic system.[21] Although globalization weakens the importance of state boundaries, states respond to this challenge by producing new forms of legality. States also remain crucial to guaranteeing a globalized legal order.[22]

Globalization challenges a specific type of state, one that aims to homogenize its citizens through sociocultural policies. It weakens state monopolies in different areas (that is, the economy, the media, and education) through a free market system and the spread of communications technologies.[23] Globalization weakens state capacity to use "social engineering" as a tool to shape society.[24] A state may try to limit the influence of globalization in order to preserve its sociocultural monopoly. That process can be "deeply anti-democratic" because it requires "an inevitable extension of the powers of the state" to suppress both the global flows and the freedom of its citizens.[25]

In this paper, I analyze two types of opportunity structures—domestic and international—which are both influenced by globalization. Domestic opportunity structures mean emerging opportunities for social movements to set up economic, media, and educational institutions as a result of the weakening of state monopolies in these three domains. By international opportunity structures, I imply three things: first, international opportunities, which emerged as a result of the decline of state monopolies in several countries, and which facilitate the institutional diffusion of transnational social movements; second, trans-border networks and resources, which support social movements ideationally and materially; and third, international institutions and norms, which support social movements repressed by their own states. There is a strong interaction between domestic opportunity structures and these three types of international opportunities.

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[21] Peter Evans, "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization," *World Politics* 50 (October 1997): 62–87.

[22] Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 24–26; Saskia Sassen, "Whose City Is It? Globalization and the Formation of New Claims," *Public Culture* 8 (Winter 1996): 213.

[23] Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, "Introduction" in Sandra Braman and Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, eds., *Globalization, Communication and Transnational Civil Society* (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1996), 1–19.

[24] Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 1999), 263.

[25] Peter Martin, "Une obligation morale [The Moral Case for Globalization]," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (June 1997): 14.

GLOBALIZATION, THE STATE, AND DOMESTIC OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES IN TURKEY

Globalization has had an eminent impact on domestic opportunity structures in Turkey, particularly since the premiership and then presidency of Turgut Özal (1983–1993).[26] Before the Özal period, there was a substantial state monopoly on economic and even sociocultural life. The state was using import-substituting industrialization and controlling the market. There was a monopoly of the one-channel public television, the public radio station, and public universities. Özal led policies on economic liberalization and the development of communications technologies. The economic structure changed from an import substitution-based statist economy to an export-led liberal economy. The state control over foreign currency exchange was abolished and the Turkish *lira* became convertible. Along the same lines, the Turkish stock exchange was constituted in Istanbul. State-owned enterprises became increasingly privatized, and private education began to spread. Economic liberalization was strongly related to the transfer of communications technologies. In the early 1990s, the state monopoly on television and radio stations was ended. Subsequently, the number of private radio stations blossomed. The number of national television channels has increased to about twenty. Recently, the use of cellular phones, fax machines, and computers has increased, as has the use of the Internet. The spread of communications technologies facilitated the emergence of heterogeneous identities and cultural diversity beyond the control of the state.[27]

Economic liberalization and new communications technologies provided Islamic movements the opportunity to set up their own economic, media, and educational institutions.[28] After the decline of state monopoly in these three domains, Islamic movements became more visible in the public sphere.[29] Economic liberalization facilitated the emergence of a new pro-Islamic bourgeoisie, the so-called Anatolian Tigers. They founded business associations (for example, MÜSİAD) as alternatives to TÜSİAD, which represents the high bourgeoisie. Moreover, the Islamic movements have developed several media networks, including television channels, radio stations, and publications. The spread of communications technologies created new public arenas for formerly marginalized people. In fact, the Muslim public is the "best organized of the

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[26] For Özal's presidency, see Metin Heper and Menderes Çınar, "Parliamentary Government with a Strong President: The Post-1989 Turkish Experience," *Political Science Quarterly* 111 (Fall 1996): 493–497.

[27] Haluk Şahin and Asu Aksoy, "Global Media and Cultural Identity in Turkey," *Journal of Communication* 43 (Spring 1993): 36.

[28] Ali Bulaç argues that Muslims should appreciate globalization, which weakens the nation-state and empowers individuals. Ali Bulaç, "Küreselleşme Kimi Tehdit Ediyor? [Whom does Globalization Challenge?]," *Zaman*, 24 July 2001; "Küreselleşme İslamı Tehdit Ediyor mu? [Does Globalization Challenge Islam?]," *Zaman*, 25 July 2001.

[29] See Nilüfer Göle, "Snapshots of Islamic Modernities," *Daedalus* 129 (Winter 2000): 91–117.

new publics" in Turkey.[30] In sum, the interaction between globalization and the state has shaped domestic opportunity structures in Turkey, which has helped Islamic movements to constitute their own institutions.

In the early 1990s, Özal was leading liberal state policies aimed at engaging globalization. In the late 1990s, however, the Turkish establishment noticed a trade-off between the benefits of the engagement with globalization for the country on the one hand, and the rise of the Islamic movements at the expense of the statist regime on the other. The establishment was alerted by the rise of the Islamic movements and tended to adopt repressive state policies.[31] In the Milli Guvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council) (MGK) summit of 28 February 1997, the military directly intervened in politics in what has been described as a "soft" coup d'état.[32] This summit dictated eighteen demands that the government of pro-Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan oppress the Islamic movements. The military gained support from other parts of the establishment,[33] such as the media, the judiciary, and the high bourgeoisie. The soft coup d'état claimed to be protecting *laiklik* (secularism).[34] As a part of this new process, religious education was restricted, and veiling in schools was strictly banned.[35] The military removed its allegedly Islamist officers. Pro-Islamic corporations and banks faced official discrimination and were forced to stop their financial support of Islamic movements. The change of state policies from liberal to repressive with the February 28 coup changed the opportunity structures and created new domestic constraints for Islamic movements. It also created new incentives for these movements to search for alternative international opportunities.

Although all Turkish Islamic movements have experienced a relatively homogenous domestic opportunity structure, they have developed very heterogeneous attitudes toward globalization. Therefore, we need to analyze some variables other than the domestic opportunity structure, such as international opportunity structures and the normative frameworks of movements, to explain this diversification.

[30] Jenny B. White, "Amplifying Trust: Community and Communication in Turkey" in Dale F. Eickelman and John W. Anderson, eds., *New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 177.

[31] M. Hakan Yavuz, "Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere," *Journal of International Affairs* 54 (2000): 21–42.

[32] Ben Lombardi, "Turkey—The Return of the Reluctant Generals?" *Political Science Quarterly* 112 (Summer 1997): 214–215.

[33] I prefer to use the term "establishment" rather than the "state," for avoiding the false state–society dichotomy. See, for the blurry boundaries between state and society, Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How the States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[34] For the difference between *laïcité* (secularism) as a regime and *laïcisme* (secularism) as an ideology in Turkey, see Semih Vaner, "Introduction," *Cahiers d'Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien* 27 (January–June 1999): 11–12.

[35] See Nuh Gönültaş, "Vatan Dayak Yemediğin Yerdir! [Motherland Is Where You Are not Beaten!]," *Zaman*, 29 September 2000.

The Gülen Movement

The Gülen movement developed a pro-globalization view in the 1990s. If my two hypotheses are correct, this movement should first, have benefited from international opportunity structures shaped by globalization, and second, have had a tolerant normative framework open to cross-cultural interactions.

The Gülen movement emerged in the late 1960s as a local group around İzmir. In the mid-1980s, it began to open educational institutions and spread to other parts of Turkey. As it spread geographically, it transformed from a local group into a nationwide social movement. Ties became more impersonal, and abstract principles prevailed instead of communitarian customs. In the 1990s, the Gülen movement experienced its second transformation. It changed from a national social movement into a transnational one by opening institutions internationally and gathering sympathizers from several nationalities.[36]

Throughout the 1990s, the Gülen movement benefited from the international opportunity structures shaped by globalization in three main ways. First, globalization has weakened the state monopoly on sociocultural and economic life in many countries. This has allowed the institutional diffusion of the Gülen movement in more than fifty countries. Second, the movement has taken advantage of the conceptual and legal framework of transnational movements and nongovernmental organizations. It has primarily benefited from the transnational Turkish diaspora, in addition to its sympathizers from different nationalities. Finally, it has employed international opportunities to balance the repression of the Turkish state. The initiator of the movement, Fethullah Gülen, has lived in the United States since 1999 because of the repressive political atmosphere of Turkey, in addition to some personal health problems.

Particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gülen movement opened institutions in the former communist countries. Later on, it extended its education, media, and business networks to more than fifty countries. The movement has been active in a wide geographic area, from North America to East Asia. Currently, private companies and foundations affiliated with the Gülen movement operate hundreds of dormitories, preparatory schools, and high schools, in addition to six universities in Turkey and abroad.[37] They also operate a media network, including Samanyolu, a television channel with a global satellite outreach; several local and national radio stations; *Zaman*, a newspaper published in twelve different countries; *Aksiyon*, a news magazine; *The Fountain*, an international magazine in English; and about ten other magazines, which cover issues ranging from ecology, literature, and theology to popular science.

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[36] The author's personal interviews and observations in Turkey, Turkmenistan, and the United States in the Gülen movement's institutions.

[37] See M. Hakan Yavuz, "Towards an Islamic Liberalism? The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen," *The Middle East Journal* 53 (Autumn 1999): 599; See also Elisabeth Özdalga, "Worldly Asceticism in Islamic Casting: Fethullah Gülen's Inspired Piety and Activism," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 17 (Fall 2000): 83–104.

Do the opportunity structures have an independent impact on the Gülen movement's international expansion? We can answer this by analyzing the cases of failure for the movement's spread. The movement's schools and media outlets were officially closed in two countries—Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. In the early 1990s, opportunity structures helped the movement to open institutions in these countries. However, the emergence of authoritarianism in Uzbekistan and the Taliban rule in Afghanistan withered the opportunities for the movement, particularly through the state monopolies in education and the media. These two regimes resisted the impact of globalization and did not respect the legitimacy of international nongovernmental organizations. In sum, the end of the opportunity structures in these two countries meant the official closure of the Gülen movement's schools and media outlets.

Two resources have helped the Gülen movement to benefit from international opportunity structures. First, the movement has been very successful in English instruction, which has been in high demand in many countries, for example, the former Soviet republics.[38] The students of the movement's schools have won several medals in the International Scientific Olympics, in addition to achieving the top scores in nationwide university entrance examinations in Turkey. The movement has reproduced this success in many other countries. The second resource of the movement is that it has created a synergy based on cooperation between educators and businesspeople. The sympathizers of the Gülen movement have been powerful enough to establish an interest-free bank and insurance company. Without the financial donations of business, the movement's schools could not afford to operate.

The second variable that shapes the attitudes of Islamic movements toward globalization is their normative frameworks. The Gülen movement has had a tolerant normative framework that has been open to cross-cultural interactions. This has affected the movement's pro-globalization stand. Gülen's thinking has been very much influenced by the writings of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1876–1960).[39] Nursi's *Risale-i Nur*, a collection of approximately 120 pamphlets, is an interpretation of the Qur'an and is widely read among the Gülen movement's sympathizers. Nursi opposed violence and the politization of Islam.[40] He encouraged interfaith dialogue and appreciated globalization as early as the 1910s: "The world became a single city with the improvement of the transportation facilities. Communication facilities, such as print and the telegraph, also made the world population into a population of a single place."[41]

[38] See Ahmet T. Kuru, "Between the State and Cultural Zones: Nation-Building in Turkmenistan," *Central Asian Survey* 21 (March 2002): 83–84.

[39] See the special issue of *The Muslim World* 89 (July–October 1999), edited by M. Hakan Yavuz. See also Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, ed., *Islam at the Crossroads: On the Life and Thought of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2003).

[40] Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, "Mektubat [The Letters]" in *Risale-i Nur Külliyatı* [The Epistles of Light] (İstanbul: Nesil Yayıcılık, 1996), 366–368.

[41] Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, "Muhakemat [The Reasoning]" [İstanbul, 1912] in *Risale-i Nur Külliyatı*, 1997.

In the late Ottoman era, Nursi defended the idea that Christians could hold administrative positions in the Empire.[42] He specifically encouraged Muslim–Christian cooperation in the struggle against materialism and atheism. During the Second World War, he was concerned about the non-Muslim war victims in Europe and held that the non-Muslim children became martyrs and the innocent adults might have gained salvation.[43] Because of Nursi's influence, the Gülen movement has always respected human dignity, and it has never regarded Christians and Jews as the "enemy." When the movement began to construct its positive discourse on globalization and the West, Nursi's influence became more visible.

Until the 1990s, the Gülen movement had focused on the spread of religious messages and had been isolated from political life. For that reason, it did not have a definitive view of globalization. In the 1990s, it became visible in the public sphere in Turkey[44] and opened institutions abroad with the help of international opportunity structures. In this period, the movement developed a positive attitude toward globalization, with an emphasis on religious tolerance, interfaith dialogue, and democracy.[45] In 1994, the movement founded the Foundation of Journalists and Writers (FJW) to organize public meetings aimed at promoting tolerance and dialogue. These two concepts became the mottos of the movement, which has interacted with different cultures and governments all around the world, and has, therefore, needed a language of engagement.[46] The FJW's meetings have regularly brought together academics, intellectuals, and religious leaders. In 1997, the FJW organized the Inter-Civilization Dialogue Congress as a reaction to the "clash of civilizations" thesis. In 1998, the FJW initiated the Eurasian Meetings that have annually brought together intellectuals from several Eurasian countries. In 2000, the FJW coordinated the meeting of the representatives of the three "Abrahamic" religions in Turkey.

The FJW has also organized the annual Abant Workshops, which have involved approximately fifty Turkish intellectuals from different ideological backgrounds. The first workshop, held in 1988, primarily discussed Islam and secularism. Its press declaration stressed that God's ontological sovereignty is

[42] Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, "Münazarat [The Debates]" in *Risale-i Nur Külliyatı*, 1945. See also Zeki Sarıtoprak, "Said Nursi's Teachings on the People of the Book: A Case Study of Islamic Social Policy in the Early Twentieth Century," *Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations* 11 (October 2000): 321–332.

[43] Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, "Kastamonu Lahikası [The Kastamonu Letters]" in *Risale-i Nur Killiyatı*, 1615.

[44] Uğur Kömeçoğlu, "Kutsal ile Kamusal: Fethullah Gülen Cemaat Hareketi [The Sacred and the Public: The Fethullah Gülen Communal Movement]" in Nilüfer Göle, ed., *İslamın Yeni Kamusal Yüzleri* [Islam's New Public Faces] (İstanbul: Metis, 2000), 148–194.

[45] Hüseyin Gülerce, "Yeni Dinamikler [New Dynamics]," *Zaman*, 19 June 2001.

[46] See Bekim Agai, "The Gülen Movement's Islamic Ethic of Education" in M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, eds., *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 48–68.

compatible with the political sovereignty of the people.[47] The second workshop examined the relationships among religion, state, and society.[48] The third meeting was devoted to democracy and the rule of law. Its final declaration stressed that Islam was not a barrier to democracy.[49] The fourth workshop explored the issue of pluralism, and the fifth discussed globalization.

Since the mid-1990s, Gülen has made positive statements about globalization. He has argued that the globalization process might become an opportunity for Muslims if they would proactively contribute to this process. In his own words: "Modern means of communication and transportation have transformed the world into a large, global village. . . . This time is a period of interactive relations. Nations and peoples are more in need of and dependent on each other, which causes closeness in mutual relations."[50] Gülen has also claimed a relationship between globalization and democracy; as a result of globalization, "the individual comes to the fore, making it inevitable that democratic governments that respect personal rights will replace oppressive regimes."[51] According to Gülen, there is a strong connection between globalization and the necessity of tolerance:

> Although the world increasingly resembles a global village, different belief systems, races, and customs will continue to survive. Each individual is a unique being; therefore it is a utopian idea to standardize people. The harmony and peace of the global village are based on the recognition and respect of this diversity. . . . In other words, it depends on a global tolerance and dialogue. Otherwise, the world will result in its own end through fighting and wars.[52]

Following the 1990s, Gülen has primarily devoted his speeches, writings, and media interviews to religious tolerance and interfaith dialogue. He has met with religious leaders, including Pope John Paul II, the Panahriot Greek Patriarch Bartholomeos, and Israeli Sephardic Head Rabbi Eliyahu B. Doron.[53] Gülen's relations with Christians and Jews have been criticized by some Islamists. The Ibda-C, the fundamentalist terrorist group, reportedly plotted assassination attempts against Gülen. In fact, Gülen is very critical of terrorism. He strongly condemned the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, where he has lived for six years. In his statement in the *Washington Post*,

[47] *İslam ve Laiklik* [Islam and Secularism] (İstanbul: Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı, 1998).

[48] *Din, Devlet, Toplum* [Religion, State, and Society] (İstanbul: Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı, 1999).

[49] *Demokratik Hukuk Devleti* [Democratic State and the Rule of Law] (İstanbul: Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı, 2000).

[50] Fethullah Gülen, "At the Threshold of the New Millennium," *The Fountain* 3 (January–March 2000): 7.

[51] Ibid., 8.

[52] Quoted in Nevval Sevindi, *Fethullah Gülen ile Global Hoşgörü ve New York Sohbeti* [Global Tolerance and the New York Interview with Fethullah Gülen] (İstanbul: Timaş, 2002), 42.

[53] See Ali Ünal and Alphonse Williams, eds., *Advocate of Dialogue: Fethullah Gülen* (Fairfax: The Fountain, 2001).

on 21 September 2001, Gülen emphasized, "Islam abhors such acts of terror. A religion that professes, 'He who unjustly kills one man kills the whole of humanity' cannot condone senseless killing of thousands."

Gülen has also frequently referred to democracy and the West in a positive manner. In 1994, he made his first public speech on democracy, in which he stressed that it was impossible to retreat from democracy in Turkey.[54] Although some Islamists strongly criticized this speech, Gülen has continued to emphasize the importance of democracy. By the same token, in an interview in 1995, he opposed anti-Western feelings: "Anti-Westernism would force us out of civilization."[55] He also acknowledged that Muslims had many things to learn from the West[56] and stated that Turkey's integration into the EU would not result in cultural assimilation for Turkish society.[57] In 2000, in a written response to questions from the *New York Times*, Gülen referred to the Western democracies as a political model for Turkey: "Standards of justice and democracy [in Turkey] must be elevated to the level of our contemporaries in the West."[58]

Gülen sees democracy as a developing and irreversible process that has not yet reached its final point. In his view, an ideal democracy should also take into consideration human concerns, even about the hereafter.[59] In his article published in *SAIS Review* in 2001, he argued that Islam and democracy are compatible. He also rejected the ideology of political Islamism: "Islam does not propose a certain unchangeable form of government or attempt to shape it. Instead, Islam establishes fundamental principles that orient a government's general character, leaving it to the people to choose the type and form of government according to time and circumstances."[60] According to Gülen, Islam does not legitimize totalitarian regimes: "Islam considers a society to be composed of conscious individuals equipped with free will."[61]

In sum, the analysis of the Gülen movement supports my two hypotheses. The movement has constructed a pro-globalization and pro-Western attitude as a result of its interaction with international opportunity structures and its tolerant normative framework. In the next section, I will test my hypotheses in a different case and search for an answer to the following question: Why does an Islamic movement become antiglobalization?

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[54] Eyüp Can, *Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi ile Ufuk Turu* [The Tour d'Horizon with Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi] (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayıları, 1996), 129.

[55] Ibid., 43.

[56] For Gülen's views on Western modernity, see Ahmet T. Kuru, "Fethullah Gülen's Search for a Middle Way between Modernity and Muslim Tradition" in Yavuz and Esposito, eds., *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*, 115–130.

[57] Can, *Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi*, 43. For Gülen's ideas on the EU, see Hasan Kösebalaban, "The Making of Enemy and Friend: Fethullah Gülen's National-Security Identity" in Yavuz and Esposito, eds., *Turkish Islam and the Secular State*, 170–183.

[58] Douglas Frantz, "Turkey Assails a Revered Islamic Moderate," *New York Times*, 25 August 2000.

[59] Nevval Sevindi, *Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti* (İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1997), 78.

[60] Fethullah Gülen, "A Comparative Approach to Islam and Democracy," translated by Elvan Ceylan, *SAIS Review* 21 (Summer–Fall 2001): 134.

[61] Ibid., 135.

THE HAYDAR BAŞ MOVEMENT

The Haydar Baş movement developed an antiglobalization view in the 1990s. According to my two hypotheses, this movement should first, have not benefited from international opportunity structures shaped by globalization, and second, have had an intolerant normative framework, which has been closed to cross-cultural interactions.

The Haydar Baş movement, which takes its name from its leader, emerged as a branch of the Kadiri *tarikat.* In the 1990s, it opened institutions in different parts of Turkey, involved itself in public affairs, and became a nationwide social movement. Today, it is affiliated with two nationwide television channels (Mesaj TV and Meltem TV), a newspaper (*Yeni Mesaj*), and magazines. The movement has spread its religio-nationalist messages through its media network, and has business investments and a limited number of schools.

The Haydar Baş movement does not have a significant number of institutions in foreign countries. Therefore, it has not benefited from the international opportunities that have emerged as a result of the decline of state monopolies or that exist as trans-border networks and resources. Why did the Haydar Baş movement not open institutions in foreign countries as the Gülen movement did? The answer is twofold. The first is based on the movement's choice. The Haydar Baş movement ignores emerging international opportunities because of its religio-nationalist normative framework, which focuses on Turkey at the expense of trans-border issues. This shows the direct interaction between a movement's normative framework and its engagement with international opportunity structures. The second is based on the movement's resources. Unlike the Gülen movement, the Haydar Baş movement has had limited human, financial, and institutional resources, which has made international diffusion difficult.

Additionally, the Haydar Baş movement has not benefited from international opportunities to be saved from state repression. Whenever the movement has faced state repression, it has not referred to international norms and has not applied to international institutions. Instead, it has chosen co-optation by the state. It has frequently shown its conformity to the state in its media network.[62] As a result, it has constructed a statist discourse that opposes globalization.

In terms of the second variable, the Haydar Baş movement has had an intolerant normative framework. The movement's religio-nationalist normative framework is built on an unfriendly view of other religions. It has regarded dialogue with Christians and Jews as a threat to Islamic identity. Haydar Baş, for example, has argued that Christian missionaries constitute a severe threat by seeking to convert Turks to Christianity. Because of this perceived threat, the Haydar Baş movement, unlike the Gülen movement, has avoided interaction with non-Muslims. For that reason, the Haydar Baş movement has been very critical of the Gülen movement's activities involving interfaith dialogue. In 1998, Gü-

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[62] Taha Kıvanç, "Tarikatlerle Temas [Contact with *Tariqats*]," *Yeni Şafak*, 3 July 2001.

len visited the Pope in the Vatican. The Haydar Baş movement strongly criticized this visit. Similarly, in 2000, the Gülen movement organized the meeting of three Abrahamic religions in Urfa, Turkey. The Haydar Baş movement, again, condemned this meeting. In sum, for the Haydar Baş movement, spreading internationally has not been worth risking the loss of identity and solidarity. Therefore, it has perceived globalization as a challenge, avoided international integration, and aimed to preserve its identity through an antiglobalization discourse.[63]

In 2001, the Haydar Baş movement founded a political party, the Bağımsız Türkiye (Independent Turkey) Party (BTP) under the leadership of Haydar Baş. The BTP received less than 1 percent of the votes in the 2002 national elections. It has focused on the spread of the movement's religio-nationalist views. The BTP has been against globalization and has defined it as "a concept created by industrialized states after the Second World War to exploit underdeveloped and developing countries' natural resources."[64] It has also claimed that EU membership would be a type of colonialization that would violate Turkey's cultural, economic, and political independence.[65]

Haydar Baş has claimed that there are two totally contradictory civilizations, namely Western and Islamic. The former desires to oppress, to rule, and to destroy, whereas the latter wishes to help, to develop, and to construct. For him, the EU is a Christian club: "The EU put on the Euro the pictures of the doors of two cathedrals, St. Pierre and Notre Dame. . . . The twelve stars on the EU's flag represent the twelve apostles of Jesus."[66] Haydar Baş has also opposed globalization. In his own words:

> Globalization is a concept originating from the West which has became a façade to adamantly impose particular ideas on underdeveloped countries, such as the claim that the borders are removed and nations are cooperating by ignoring their economic, cultural, and civilizational differences. The Western countries which produced this concept, however, consolidate the Christian unity and raise walls against other countries. That is a very normal situation, because globalization is constructed to maintain the hegemony of Christian faith and civilization. In this regard, we have to be cautious against the global exploitation and destruction of local cultures. We need to take precautions to preserve our belief system, civilization, and solidarity. The primary precaution is to follow policies that prioritize nationality.[67]

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[63] See, for the similarities between nationalist and anti-globalist discourses, Fred Halliday, "The Middle East and the Politics of Differential Integration" in Toy Dodge and Richard Higgot, eds., *Globalization and the Middle East: Islam, Economy, Society, and Politics* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002), 41.

[64] Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi, "Küreselleşme Nedir [What is Globalization]?" 20 May 2003, accessed on the website of the BTP at http://www.btp.org.tr/index.php?temelgorusler=1, 15 June 2003.

[65] Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi, "AB'ye Basvuru [Application to the EU]," accessed on the website of the BTP at http://www.btp.org.tr/basvuru.htm, 30 May 2002.

[66] Haydar Baş, "Haftanın Sohbeti [The Interview of the Week]," *Yeni Mesaj*, 26 April 2002. See also Haydar Baş, "Türk Milleti İkinci Sevr'e Müsaade Etmeyecektir [The Turkish Nation Will Not Allow the Second Sevres Treaty]," *Yeni Mesaj*, 16 August 2002.

[67] Haydar Baş, "Küreselleşme ile Örtülen Gerçekler [The Facts Hidden by Globalization]," *Yeni Mesaj*, 19 May 2001. See also Haydar Baş, "Küreselleşme ve ABD Hegemonyası [Globalization and the American Hegemony]," *Yeni Mesaj*, 28 July 2001.

The discussion on globalization among Islamic movements has strongly related to contemporary politics in Turkey: "Turkish politics . . . will increasingly be organized along the lines of 'globalisers' and 'antiglobalisers' . . . as opposed to cleavages based on the previous left-right or Islam-secularism axes."[68] The statist part of the Turkish establishment opposes Turkey's integration with the EU,[69] since "membership of the EU would mean breaking down the concept of the *Devlet Baba* (Father State), which holds that the state should be served by the people, not the other way round."[70] In 2001, in a symposium on the EU organized by the Turkish military academies, some generals resisted Turkey's EU membership, claiming that the EU was a "Christian club."[71] In 2002, the secretary general of the MGK, General Tuncer Kılınç, insisted that Turkey should cooperate with Russia and Iran, instead of the EU.[72] The Haydar Baş movement has agreed with this statist perspective and has cooperated with secular groups in opposing globalization and the EU.

Consequently, the Haydar Baş movement developed a negative attitude toward globalization because it has not benefited from international opportunities and has had an intolerant religio-nationalist normative framework. The Haydar Baş movement has perceived globalization to be a challenge and has resisted it to preserve its identity.

To this point, I have analyzed one clearly positive and one clearly negative view of globalization. The following section will examine a more changing and divided stand.

THE MİLLİ GÖRÜŞ MOVEMENT

The Milli Görüş movement had an antiglobalization and anti-Western attitude until the late 1990s. Following the February 28 coup in 1997, the movement found itself divided by the opposing views of the elders and the younger members. Ultimately, the younger generation left the movement completely. If my two hypotheses are correct, the antiglobalization attitudes of the early Milli Görüş movement and the elders of the late Milli Görüş movement should first, have not benefited from international opportunity structures, and second, have had intolerant normative frameworks. Yet the pro-globalization view of the younger generation of the late Milli Görüş movement should have had the opposite features.

[68] Ziya Öniş, "Globalization, Democratization and the Far Right: Turkey's Nationalist Action Party in Critical Perspective," *Democratization* 10 (Spring 2003): 33–34.

[69] See, for these changing perspectives about the EU in Turkey, Hasan Kösebalaban, "Turkey's EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures," *Middle East Policy* 9 (June 2002): 130–146.

[70] "Is It Adieu to Ataturk?," *The Economist*, 18 December 1999, 43.

[71] "AB Hristiyan Kulübü [EU, A Christian Club]," *Radikal*, 14 January 2001.

[72] "AB'den Destek Yok, Doğu'ya Bak [No Support from the EU, Turn to the East]," *Hürriyet*, 7 March 2002.

The Milli Görüş movement was initiated by Erbakan. In 1970, Erbakan and his followers founded the Milli Nizam (National Order) Party (MNP). The party was disbanded following the military coup d'état in 1971. In 1972, the former cadres of the MNP founded the Milli Selamet (National Salvation) Party. That party also was disbanded, by the military coup d'état in 1980. These parties were both accused of being antisecular. When its party was disbanded, the movement founded a new one, rather than protesting radically against the state. The movement has also had links with sociocultural institutions[73] (for example, the National Youth Foundation) and media outlets (for example, *Milli Gazete*).

In 1983, the Milli Görüş movement founded the Refah (Welfare) Party (RP). The RP gained influence in the 1990s in Turkish politics and was simultaneously strengthened by the nationwide rise of Islamic movements. It became increasingly successful in national elections with the support of the new Anatolian bourgeoisie and pro-Islamic media networks. It won the mayors' seats in Turkey's two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara, in 1994. In the national parliamentary elections, the RP increased its share of the votes from 7.2 percent in 1987 to 21.4 percent in 1995 and became the leading party.[74] Erbakan became prime minister in 1996 in the RP-True Path Party (DYP) coalition.

Until the end of the 1990s, the Milli Görüş movement did not benefit from international opportunities. It was a national movement that sought a top-down transformation of society via politics, unlike the Gülen movement, which focused on a bottom-up transformation via education. The Milli Görüş movement was restricted by Turkey[75] and did not attempt to spread out to other countries by benefiting from international opportunities, nor did it see the international institutions and norms as an opportunity to be saved from state repression. Instead, it saw international institutions and norms as extensions of the Western hegemony that collaborated with the repressive state.

In addition to the lack of international opportunities, the intolerant normative framework of the movement, political Islamism, was shaping the movement's antiglobalization view. In the 1970s, the movement sought to lead the country's development of heavy industry.[76] That discourse was consistent with the personality of Erbakan, who was a professor of mechanical engineering and worked on the Leopard tank project in Germany. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the movement used a second discourse based on welfare policies, as empha-

[73] See Ali Bayramoğlu, *Türkiye'de İslami Hareket: Sosyolojik Bir Bakış* [The Islamic Movement in Turkey: A Sociological Perspective] (İstanbul: Patika, 2001), 64.

[74] M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 240.

[75] The Milli Görüş movement has also a branch in Germany. That branch, however, does not have a major impact on the movement's attitude toward globalization.

[76] Haldun Gülalp, "Modernization Policies and Islamist Politics in Turkey" in Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 59.

sized in the title of its party (Welfare Party). Yet, during both of these periods, the Milli Görüş movement preserved the core of its normative framework—political Islamism. Moreover, anti-Westernism was a sine qua non for the movement.[77]

The RP, therefore, had a political Islamist and anti-Western agenda. It opposed Turkey's membership in the EU. The RP was planning to found an Islamic Union and to create an Islamic currency. In late 1996 and early 1997, Erbakan visited several Muslim countries as the prime minister, and tried to organize an Islamic Union. He succeeded in creating an international cooperation organization among eight Muslim countries, referred to as the D-8 (Developing Eight). This became a topic of debate between the Gülen and the Milli Görüş movements. Gülen defined D-8 as a vain project and a "very cheap message" to Erbakan's constituency.[78] Because of these types of disagreements, the Gülen movement did not support the RP. It continued to pursue the principle of political neutrality and to establish good relations with all political parties, including the leftist ones.

The February 28 "soft" coup in 1997 ended the RP-DYP coalition and substantially impacted the Milli Görüş movement. Erbakan was forced to resign in June, 1997.[79] The RP was dissolved, and Erbakan was banned from politics in 1998 by the Turkish Supreme Court. Shortly after that, the RP's mayor of Istanbul, Tayyip Erdoğan, was imprisoned for reciting a poem, and consequently banished from political life.

Following the February 28 coup, the Milli Görüş gradually divided into two groups—the elders, led by Erbakan, and the younger generation, led by Erdoğan. Because of state repression, both of these groups tended to see international institutions and norms as opportunities for protection of their rights. Erbakan, for example, appealed to the European Court of Human Rights to overturn the dissolution of the RP and his ban from politics by the Turkish Constitutional Court.

As the Milli Görüş movement attempted to benefit from international opportunity structures, the movement's discourse toward globalization became increasingly positive. After the closure of the RP, RP's parliamentarians founded the Fazilet (Virtue) Party (FP). The FP became "one of the keenest on Turkish membership of the EU,"[80] mainly because it hoped that membership would end the limitations on freedoms and restrict the role of the military in politics.[81] The

[77] İhsan D. Dağı, *Kimlik, Söylem ve Siyaset: Doğu-Batı Ayrımında Refah Partisi Geleneği* [Identity, Discourse, and Politics: The Tradition of Welfare Party in the Crossroads of the East and the West] (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1998).

[78] Sevindi, *Fethullah Gülen ile New York Sohbeti*, 33.

[79] Michael M. Gunter, "The Silent Coup: The Secularist-Islamist Struggle in Turkey," *Journal of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 21 (Spring 1998): 11.

[80] "Ataturk's Long Shadow (Founder of Modern Turkish Nation-state)," *The Economist*, 10 June 2000, 3.

[81] Reşat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdoğan, "Turkey at a Crossroad," *Journal of International Affairs* 54 (Fall 2000): 18.

FP also began to seek a dialogue with the United States. In 1999, the official leader of the FP, Recai Kutan, visited Washington to meet with American politicians and Jewish lobby groups.[82] The FP revised its discourse and started to emphasize democracy and the rule of law. In May 1998, Kutan, in a television interview, emphasized that this revision was the main difference between the RP and the FP. He explained that the latter stressed the promotion of democracy, human rights, and political freedom. He also stressed that the leaders of the FP "had learned from their experience in the last couple of years that democracy comes first—without it, nothing else can be accomplished."[83] As Ziya Öniş points out, the political program of the FP was substantially different from that of its predecessor, the RP. The RP had possessed a strong anti-EU view, referred specifically to Islam, stressed religious and social rights, attached importance to the central government, and emphasized the strong economic role of the state. The FP, however, favored Turkey's EU membership, referred to religious rights as part of a broader agenda on democratization, emphasized individual and human rights, attached importance to decentralization and local governments, and stressed the market economy and privatization.[84]

Despite the FP's democratic discourse, Turkey's Constitutional Court dissolved the party in 2001, arguing that it had become a standard-bearer against secularism by defending the right to wear a headscarf at universities and in the Turkish Parliament. This closure deepened the disagreement between the elders led by Erbakan and the younger generation led by Erdoğan. The elders were inclined to preserve political Islamism as the normative framework, whereas the young generation was for democracy. The followers of Erbakan founded the Saadet (Felicity) Party (SP), whereas those of Erdoğan founded the Adalet ve Kalkınma (Justice and Development) Party (AKP). The discussion about the EU became an important fault line between these two parties.

The SP returned to the anti-EU and antiglobalization discourse. Two factors were influential in this return. First, in 2001, the European Court of Human Rights rejected Erbakan's appeal of the Turkish Constitutional Court's dissolution of the RP and his ban from politics. This meant that international institutions and norms were not real opportunities for Erbakan and his new party. Second, the younger generation of the Milli Görüş, who were resisting the old political Islamist normative framework, were gone. The elder generation, led by Erbakan again, monopolized the Milli Görüş movement. They easily reemphasized political Islamism. In sum, the end of international opportunities and the return to an intolerant normative framework marked the movement's

[82] "Turkey's Islamists: The Reformers Make Their Bids," *The Economist*, 13 November 1999, 57.

[83] Quoted in Haldun Gülalp, "The Poverty of Democracy in Turkey: The Refah Party Episode," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 21 (Fall 1999): 54.

[84] Ziya Öniş, "Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-existence," *Contemporary Politics* 7 (December 2001): 281–298. See also Ziya Öniş, "Neoliberal Globalization and the Democracy Paradox: The Turkish General Election of 1999," *Journal of International Affairs* 54 (Fall 2000): 304.

return to antiglobalizationism, thus supporting my two hypotheses. With its political Islamist discourse, the SP received only 2.5 percent of the national votes in the elections of 3 November 2002.

The younger generation of the Milli Görüş movement, however, abandoned their political Islamist views. In 2000, the two leaders of the younger generation, Erdoğan and Bülent Arınç, emphasized their pro-democratic ideas in interviews with *Zaman*, which was affiliated with the Gülen movement. Erdoğan stressed that he had "internalized democracy,"[85] and Arınç declared that they had no intention of founding an Islamic state.[86] A third leading figure, Abdullah Gül, contributed to that discussion by saying that a religious party was detrimental to religion itself.[87] Additionally, the members of the younger generation have participated in the above-mentioned Abant Workshops organized by the Gülen movement to discuss issues such as democracy and secularism.[88]

The AKP has become a leading supporter of Turkey's membership in the EU. In 2002, Erdoğan pointed to the EU as the only alternative political project for Turkey: "We support Turkey's EU membership for not remaining in a suburb of civilization as a backward country in a changing and globalizing world."[89] In the November 2002 elections, the AKP won 34.3 percent of the national votes and 363 of 550 seats in the Parliament. Erdoğan visited several European capitals to ask for support for Turkey's membership. During his long trip, Erdoğan argued that Turkey's membership would be the best response to the thesis of the "clash of civilizations."[90]

Why has the AKP developed a pro-globalization perspective? Let me explain this using my two hypotheses. First, it has benefited from international opportunities. Even after the November 2003 elections, the AKP was still in a legitimacy crisis. The Turkish establishment was accusing the AKP of hiding its Islamist agenda. Erdoğan was still banned from politics. Under these circumstances, the party received tremendous support from the EU countries and the United States. Erdoğan visited almost every member country of the EU, as only the chairman of a party, but was received as the elected leader of Turkey. Similarly, he met with President George W. Bush in the White House. In these visits, Erdoğan gained international leverage to solve the domestic legitimacy crisis. Finally, the Turkish Parliament amended the Constitution to allow Erdoğan to

[85] Erdoğan's interview with Eyüp Can, *Zaman*, 6 February 2000.

[86] Arınç's interview with Mehmet Gündem, *Zaman*, 6 February 2000.

[87] "Siyasal Islam Yol Ayrımında [Political Islam at the Crossroads]," *Hürriyet*, 8 February 2000.

[88] In addition to these politicians, one of the main thinkers of Islamism, Ali Bulaç, declared that political Islamism was dead. He called for a new "civil" Islamism. Interview of Ali Bulaç, *Aksiyon*, 7–13 November 1998.

[89] "Tayyip Erdoğan: Avrupa Birliğinden Yanayız [Tayyip Erdoğan: We Are for the EU]," *Zaman*, 10 March 2002.

[90] "Erdoğan AB ve Kıbrıs İçin Radikal 'Çözüm Paketi' Önerdi [Erdoğan Proposed a Radical "Solution Packet"]," *Zaman*, 21 November 2002.

participate in politics, and Erdoğan became prime minister. Second, the AKP rejected political Islamism,[91] and identified its normative framework as "conservative democracy."[92] Erdoğan stresses that the AKP is not a part of the Milli Görüş movement, which is still affiliated with political Islamism.[93] In sum, as a result of international opportunities and the new tolerant normative framework—conservative democracy—the AKP has developed a pro-globalization view.

The role of the February 28 coup in the transformation of the Milli Görüş movement has been ardently debated in Turkey. My analysis argues that the February 28 coup played a role in this transformation by leading Islamic movements to search for alternative international opportunities and to criticize political Islamism. The theoretical implication of this argument is that changes in the opportunity structures have an impact on the normative frameworks of movements. Yet, the February 28 coup played only an unintentional and intervening role in the transformation of Islamic movements because different movements interpreted this coup differently.

CONCLUSION

The diverse attitudes of Turkish Islamic movements toward globalization depend on two variables: opportunity structures and the normative frameworks of movements. The Gülen movement and the younger generation of the late Milli Görüş movement developed positive attitudes toward globalization because they benefited from international opportunities and they had tolerant normative frameworks (*Risale-i Nur* and conservative democracy). The Haydar Baş movement, the early Milli Görüş movement, and the elders of the late Milli Görüş movement developed antiglobalization views because they did not benefit from international opportunities and had intolerant normative frameworks (religio-nationalism in the first case and political Islamism in the second and third cases).

The present paper indicated that Islamic movements needed to be analyzed through the social movement literature, rather than so-called religious essentials. It showed the contextual diversity of Islamic movements in Turkey. Although these movements have shared the same religious heritage (Sunni Islam), they have formed different attitudes. These movements have modified their discourses according to changing circumstances. In this regard, their attitudes toward globalization and the West are contingent. The contingency of the

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[91] The author's personal interview with an AKP Congressperson, September 2003, Ankara, Turkey. For the AKP's view on political Islamism and secularism, see Ahmet T. Kuru, "Reinterpretation of Secularism in Turkey: The Case of the Justice and Development Party" in M. Hakan Yavuz, ed., *Transition of Turkish Politics: The Justice and Development Party* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005, forthcoming).

[92] Yalçın Akdoğan, *Muhafazakar Demokrasi* (Ankara: AK Parti, 2003).

[93] "Erdoğan: Milli Görüş' ün Değil Demokrat Parti'nin Devamıyız [Erdoğan: We Are the Successor of the Democrat Party, not the Milli Görüş]," *Zaman*, 17 May 2003.

relationship between Islamic movements and the West provides us with an optimistic vision for resolving current misunderstandings, prejudices, and conflicts.[94] The policy advice of the paper would be that international institutions should continue to provide opportunities to Islamic movements, which are repressed by their states, in order to integrate these movements into the process of globalization.

My contributions to the social movement literature are twofold. First, I explained the impact of globalization on domestic and international opportunity structures. Second, I provided a theoretical framework that combines structural and agency-based factors, on the one hand, and the impacts of interests and ideas, on the other. I stressed that opportunity structures are not the only determining factors in social movements. Although Islamic movements exist under similar conditions, they evaluate and perceive opportunity structures through the lenses of their normative frameworks. On the other hand, the changes in domestic and international opportunity structures impact the normative frameworks of movements. In sum, both normative frameworks and international opportunity structures shape a movement's attitude toward globalization, but neither is sufficient on its own. Therefore, analyses of social movements must have a process-oriented perspective that emphasizes the interaction between opportunity structures and the normative frameworks of movements.

This paper did not claim to provide an exhaustive analysis of Islamic movements and globalization. Some relevant issues, such as the relationship between Islamic movements' understandings of social justice and global capitalism, need further analysis.[95] Additionally, the paper did not touch upon the cultural aspect of globalization. Scholars have discussed whether globalization has implied a Western cultural hegemony.[96] The positions of Islamic movements on this discussion are another subject for future studies.*

[94] See Fred Halliday, "West Encountering Islam: Islamophobia Reconsidered" in Ali Mohammadi, ed., *Islam Encountering Globalization* (New York: Routledge Courzon, 2002), 21.

[95] See, for some Muslim concerns about global economic inequality, Ahmet Taşgetiren, "Öteki Küreselleşme [The Other Globalization]," *Yeni Şafak*, 23 July 2001; Ali Bulaç, "Küresel Yoksullaşma [Global Poverty]," *Zaman*, 10 July 2002.

[96] Ali A. Mazrui, "Pretender to Universalism: Western Culture in a Globalizing Age," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 21 (April 2001): 11–24; Robert J. Holton, *Globalization and the Nation-State* (New York: Macmillan Press, 1998), 161–205; Jonathan Xavier Inda and Renato Rosaldo, "Introduction: A World in Motion" in Jonathan Xavier Inda and Renato Rosaldo, eds., *The Anthropology of Globalization: A Reader* (Malden, MA.: Blackwell, 2002), 9–26; Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, "Globalization: A Contemporary Islamic Response?" *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 15 (Fall 1998): 26–33; Murad Wilfried Hofman, "Globalization and the Muslim Future," *Middle East Affairs Journal* 6 (Fall–Winter 2000): 5–18.